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     The decision to open the Syrian banking sector to private investments in 2001, as 
part of the government’s policy to move to a social-market economy, was considered 
one of the major achievements of President Bashar al-Assad – after he had succeeded 
his father in 2000. This was a watershed moment for the Syrian economy, coming 
after decades of the nationalisation of private banks in Syria in the 1960s and the 
ensuing monopoly of state banks over the banking and financial sector. However, the 
decades-long rift between the Syrian regime – under both Assads – and Western 
countries, especially the US, has kept the country largely isolated diplomatically and 
economically. Accordingly, the continuing hostile anti-Western stance of the Syrian 
regime has stymied the regime’s efforts to attract foreign direct investments into the 
Syrian economy and the banking sector. The increasing isolation of the Syrian regime 
by the US and European countries after its rejection of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and the Syrian interference in Lebanese domestic politics, made the economy 
highly dependent on investments from the Gulf region. Between the years 2005 and 
2011, Syria witnessed a substantial inflow of foreign capital primarily from Gulf 
countries, who started investing billions of US dollars in mega-projects in the real 
estate and tourism sectors, alongside banking and insurance. Regional Arab banks that 
share similar cultural and business practices were eager to invest in a largely 
underdeveloped banking sector and an unbanked population of 21 million. The 
majority came from banks next door in Lebanon and Jordan, but others from GCC 
countries from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain have also joined the 
fray. 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide a broad overview of the banking sector in 
Syria with a focus on the ownership structure of banks operating in the country, and 
the impact of the conflict on the investments in this sector. Following the outset of 
protests in March 2011 in Syria, Western countries stepped up pressure on the Syrian 
government by imposing harsh sanctions against government officials and state-owned 
institutions including bans on state-owned banks. These measures have practically cut 
off the Syrian banking sector from international financial markets and transactions. By 
doing so, the US and the EU technically banned the supply of any type of financial 
services to the Syrian banking sector, forcing Syrian banks to turn to non-dollar 
transactions. As the Syrian conflict entered its fourth year in March 2014, studies and 
indicators point to a virtually complete collapse of economic output, domestic and 
external trade and finance in the country. The shrinking economy, international 
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sanctions compounded by the absence of public and private investments have drained 
banks’ revenues, which are still somehow operational despite the escalating conflict. 
Similarly, dozens of security officials, politicians and businessmen were added to the 
US and EU sanction list in the hope of driving them away from the regime. Some of 
those sanctioned are investors in the banking sector who also have close ties to the 
Syrian regime. Syrian government officials and entities, and state-owned banks have 
also invested in private banks that wanted to take part in the erstwhile profitable 
sector. Because of the close linkages between business and political elite in the 
country, the sanctions aimed to disrupt this dynamic and drive a wedge between these 
closely-knit relationships. This policy has largely failed, since the majority remained 
highly invested in the survival of the regime and more than three years of biting 
sanctions against them did not result in any decision to abandon the regime.  
 
As the conflict drags on in the absence of a viable political solution, the Syrian 
economy will continue to disintegrate and metastasise into a war economy. In the 
meantime, the impact of the civil war will continue to be manifested in the shrinking 
operations and ownership of the banking sector. In the past three years, the ownership 
map has changed after several local and foreign investors, both institutional and retail, 
have decided to divest from the banking sector for either economic or political 
reasons. At the same time, others have further invested in the ailing sector in spite of 
the severe operational, financial, political and security risks. The private banks, 
primarily subsidiaries of foreign regional banks and joint ventures with Syrian 
investors, have decided to maintain their presence until the resolution of the conflict, 
and will likely remain in the country for the long haul. Notwithstanding the raging 
civil war, almost all the foreign commercial entities either maintained their substantial 
shareholdings or, paradoxically, increased their ownership stake in these banks. The 
considerable investments they had made and the need for a nationwide reconstruction 
programme after the end of the conflict will outweigh the prospects for an exit from 
the country. Their decision to maintain their investments while scaling back their 
operations reflects the enormous opportunities after the ultimate resolution of the 
conflict. Eventually, it can be argued that banks will play an instrumental role in the 
reconstruction of the country, once this conflict comes to an end. It remains to be seen 
if continuing economic blockades and isolation of the Syrian regime will finally force 
foreign investors to divest from the financial system. For the time being, Arab 
investors in private banks have been biding their time while watching their annual 
negative return on investment by staying in the country. Their decision to remain in 
the country has made them one of the main beneficiaries of the ultimate resolution of 
the conflict.  
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1. Introduction: Battered economy and resilient banking sector 
     As the Syrian conflict entered its fourth year in March 2014, news coverage and 
research have either dwindled or shifted to cover a host of issues such as the 
fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Levant (ISIL), and the spill over of the Syrian conflict on neighbouring countries.1
However, little has been comparatively written about the detrimental impact of the war 
on the Syrian economy in general and the financial system in particular. The few 
reports and studies that actually tackled economic issues have attempted to speculate 
on the concealed figures of remaining foreign reserves at the reticent Syrian Central 
Bank, the depreciating exchange rate and the emergence of a new socio-economic 
class in the war economy2. The limited availability of data and the unreliability of 
official disclosures have also contributed to the difficulties in measuring economic 
indicators. Thus, international organisations and economists have struggled to learn 
about the precise conditions of the Syrian economy.    
 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were forced to stop 
collecting and publishing economic data on Syria since 2011 due to the ongoing 
conflict and the ‘uncertain political situation’3. However, independent studies and 
indicators published by Syrian-based organisations4 point to a virtually complete 
collapse of economic output, domestic and external trade and finance in the country. 
According to one study, Syria’s GDP contracted by more than 40% since the start of 
the Syrian uprising in 2011 with losses estimated at $144 billion by 2013 of only 
damaged state and residential buildings. Equally, public debt has climbed to 126% of 
GDP in 2013 and budget deficit reached 32% of GDP. Conservative estimates of 
unemployment put the rate at 50% of the country’s five million labour force, with the 
actual number to be substantially higher than that5. The country has also been 
suffering from hyperinflation, with areas outside government control bearing the brunt 
of prohibitive prices of increasingly unavailable staple items6. By the end of 2013, 
Syria’s largest city, Aleppo suffered the highest rate of hyperinflation with more than 
300%, followed by the contested northeastern city of Deir Azzour. Government price 
increases of energy and basic consumption items in the face of shrinking supply and 
the collapse of the agricultural sector have been major factors in stoking hyperinflation 
rates. As a result, the Syrian currency has precipitously depreciated; reaching 325 
Syrian pounds per US dollar in July 2013, substantially higher than the exchange rate 
of 45 pounds per dollar before March 20117. In the past six months, however, the 
currency has relatively corrected its weak position and witnessed less volatility, 
hovering around 170 pounds per US dollar in late 20148. The shortfalls have been 
primarily financed by Russian and Iranian credit facilities9, rising grants and aid 
inflows from international and non-governmental agencies along with increasing 
remittances from Syria’s growing diaspora10. 
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This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the role and status of the 
Syrian banking sector, which has played an important role in the past decade, and is 
still generally operational despite the conflict but on a minimal level11. This study 
shows that the banking sector has largely weathered the four-year-old storm, although 
the banks’ bottom line figures have taken a hard beating from the shrinking economy 
and international sanctions amid the absence of public and private investments. None 
of the state-owned banks have suspended their operations entirely or closed their 
shutters, despite biting international sanctions and dried up public finances. Equally, 
the private banks, primarily subsidiaries of foreign regional banks, have decided to 
stay put until the resolution of the conflict, and will likely remain in the country for the 
long haul. These banks have endured physical destruction of their branches and offices 
in violent-ridden cities, robberies by emerging gangs and militias on both warring 
sides, tighter inspection of their foreign-currency operations, and even embezzlement 
by some of their own staff. Nonetheless, the considerable investments they had made 
and the need for a nationwide reconstruction programme after the end of the conflict 
will outweigh the prospects for an exit from the country. 
 
It is worth mentioning from the outset that the purpose of this research is to provide a 
broad overview of the banking sector in Syria with a focus on the ownership structure 
of banks operating in the country, and the impact of the conflict on the investments in 
this sector. While the paper sheds some light on the operations of these banks during 
the conflict, the aim of the paper is not to provide a detailed financial analysis of the 
banks’ performance and position since the start of the conflict.  
 
Section two provides a brief historical background on the legacy of domination of 
government-owned banks in the Syrian economy and discusses the gradual approach 
by the Syrian government to introduce liberal market economic reforms. Section three 
discusses the sanctions imposed on state-owned banks before and during the 2011 
Syrian uprising. Section four constitutes the main focus of the research by reviewing 
the inflow of Arab investments into the financial sector, analysing the ownership 
structure of the 14 Pan-Arab banks and the impact of the conflict on their operations 
and investments. Section five explores the desired and unintended impact of Western 
sanctions on investments in the banking sector. The final section provides concluding 
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2. Legacy of domination by government-owned banks and the gradual approach 
to liberal market economy  
     Before the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the decision to liberalise the 
banking sector, as part of the government’s publicised commitment to move to a 
social-market economy, was hailed by economic experts as one of the major 
achievements of President Bashar al-Assad. In April 2001, Syrian authorities officially 
issued decree No. 28, authorising the incorporation of private banks in Syria and 
technically ending the state monopoly over the banking sector12. This was a watershed 
moment for the country’s economy, coming after decades of the nationalisation of 
private banks in Syria since the 1960s and the ensuing monopoly of state banks over 
the banking and financial sector. Likewise, the government passed decree No. 35 in 
2005 permitting Islamic banks to operate in the country, leading to the establishment 
of three Islamic ones in the country (See section 5 for more details). Since late 2003, 
after the decision of the Syrian authorities to allow the establishment of private banks, 
14 private banks started operating in Syria alongside state-owned banks in the 
country13 (See section 3 for more details).  
 
At the time when the state broke its monopoly over the banking sector, it only allowed 
foreign institutional and retail (also means individual and will be used 
interchangeably) investors to own up to 49% of these banks. Under law No. 28, 
subsidiaries of foreign private banks in Syria were required to have 51% Syrian 
ownership to be licensed in Syria. In January 2010, one year before the start of the 
uprising in 2011, the Syrian government issued law No. 3 amending some articles of 
law No. 28 of 2001. It increased the level of foreign ownership stake in private banks 
from 49% to 60% - in an effort to boost foreign investors’ confidence and attract 
foreign direct investment in the erstwhile fledgling banking and financial sector. This 
was part of the government’s five-year plan in 2010 to attract $55 billion of foreign 
direct investments to the country in the forthcoming five years.  
 
In tandem with the transformational plans to liberalise the imprint of the state-planned 
economy under the banner of social-market economy, the government announced the 
creation of Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) in 2009 14 . For decades, the 
traditional vehicles of investment in Syria were primarily in real estate, precious 
metals and, in most cases, depositing cash for fixed-term interest in local and overseas 
banks, especially in Lebanon. By establishing the DSE, the authorities hoped it would 
create alternative investment outlets, shift cash away from the then overheating real 
estate market and attract capital back into the country. Since then, the DSE has 
witnessed a growth in the number of listed companies on the exchange, even after 
2011. The DSE currently comprises 23 companies spanning various sectors, such as 
transport, media, industry, agriculture, banking and insurance. The stock exchange is 
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largely dominated by 19 capital-intensive banking and insurance companies. All the 
14 banks are listed on the Exchange15, the latest of which is Al-Baraka Bank Syria 
whose shares were listed in September 2014, in the midst of the ongoing civil war. 
 
However, the perceived reform of the financial and banking sector was not meant to 
eliminate the presence of public banks in the country16. The approach taken in the 
context of the newly found Syrian private banking system was to redistribute the 
monopolistic market share of public banks with private banks while maintaining a 
degree of protectionism of the public financial system. In other words, private banks’ 
development could not take place at the expense of state-owned banks - perceived to 
be in dire need of structural and institutional reforms. By preserving their banking 
services monopoly over the public sector, state owned banks continued to dominate 
the country. Subsequently, private banks’ capital remained limited and private banks 
followed a conservative operational and lending approach, with no significant 
expansion of their banking services and products.  
 
In Syria, there are 20 commercial banks divided broadly into two categories; six local 
state-owned banks and 14 subsidiaries of private regional banks17 – which are largely 
joint ventures with Syrian investors (See exhibits 1 and 2). The largest of these state-
owned banks is the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), which was founded in 1967 on 
the backdrop of nationalising private banks in the country. It has a total capital of SYP 
70 billion ($1.55 billion in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $463 million 
based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP). CBS is also the 
largest bank not just amongst government-owned banks but also compared to private 
banks in terms of capitalisations, operations and services - with more than 72 branches 
in the country. This has been largely due to the centralisation of government financial 
transactions and deposits in the bank, providing it with a monopoly over the budget 
and revenue of the largest employer and investor, the Syrian state. To illustrate, the 
combined capital of the five other public banks currently at SYP 21 billion ($466 
million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $139 million based on 2014 
average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP) make up less than 30% of CBS’s 
capital. Also, CBS’s capital nearly eclipses the combined capital of the 14 private 
banks, which currently stands at SYP 74 billion ($1.645 billion in pre-conflict value 
terms 45USD/SYP and $490 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP). 
 
The second largest government-owned bank in terms of capitalisation is the 
Agricultural Cooperative Bank with SYP 10.60 billion ($235 million in pre-conflict 
value terms 45USD/SYP and $70.1 million based on 2014 average official exchange 
rate of 151USD/SYP), which was established originally by the Turkish Ottomans 
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under the name of Bank of Mireh in 1880. Its stated mission is to provide banking 
facilities to the rural poor and facilitate the creation of a middle class in Syria’s rural 
areas. The bank has the largest number of branches among both public and private 
banks and operates in the country through 106 branches, with a total workforce of 
around 3,200 employees before the conflict. The bank historically made loans to 
farmers at low and subsidised interest rates ranging between 4.5% and 6%18.  
 
The four remaining state-owned banks have long provided more targeted banking 
services, but were less financed and with smaller balance sheets. Real Estate Bank, 
which has a paid-up capital of SYP 4.26 billion ($94.66 million in pre-conflict value 
terms 45USD/SYP and $28.2 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP) was founded in 1966 and offers banking services exclusively in the 
real estate sector. These include financing construction projects, granting loans to co-
operative housing associations and individuals for the building of houses, schools, 
hotels, restaurants, and commercial and industrial buildings. Popular Credit Bank was 
created in 1966 with a capital of SYP 2.33 billion ($51.77 million in pre-conflict value 
terms 45USD/SYP and $15.43 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP) to grant easy loans to small traders, artisans, professionals and low-
income people. The two smallest public banks are Savings Bank with a paid-up capital 
of SYP 2.28 billion ($50.66 million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and 
$15.09 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP) and 
Industrial Bank with only SYP 1.68 billion ($37.33 million in pre-conflict value terms 
45USD/SYP and $11.25 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP) capital. 
 
The diagram below maps state-owned banks in Syria (Exhibit 1). 
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3. Sanctions against state-owned banks 
     The decades-long hostile anti-Western stance of the Syrian government has 
incurred the Syrian economy and state-owned banks several rounds of sanctions, 
mainly imposed by the US. In 2006, the US government imposed sanctions against the 
Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) as a ‘financial institution of primary money 
laundering concern’ under the US Patriot Act. This action barred US banks and their 
overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent account with the CBS; it also 
required banks to conduct enhanced due diligence assessments to ensure that CBS is 
not circumventing the ban through its business dealings with them. Since the 2011 
Syrian uprising, Western countries stepped up pressure on the Syrian government by 
imposing harsher sanctions against government officials and state-owned institutions 
including further bans on Syrian financial institutions. In August 2011, the US 
imposed harsher sanctions against CBS and its subsidiary, the Beirut-based Syrian 
Lebanese Commercial Bank, leading to their assets freeze. The US Treasury 
Department, explained its decision to be ‘taking aim at the financial infrastructure that 
is helping provide support to [Bashar] al-Assad and his regime's illicit activities’. 
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Following the US decision, the EU also imposed similar sanctions19 on the bank in 
October 2011 and froze its assets ‘in protest against repression and human rights 
violations In Syria’. In late 2013, however, there has been a softening of EU sanctions 
in the face of deteriorating humanitarian conditions, with balance from accounts of 
CBS located in the EU now permitted to be used for the purchase of various 
humanitarian-related goods, such as basic food staples. 
 
In the autumn of 2011, the US and EU slapped sanctions20 against the Central Bank of 
Syria and three state-owned financial institutions; Real Estate Bank, Popular Credit 
Bank and Industrial Bank21. In October 2014, the US Treasury Department imposed 
further bans on four government-owned banks to further ‘increase pressure on the 
Syrian regime’ by blacklisting the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, Industrial Bank, 
Popular Credit Bank and Saving Bank for ‘acting for and providing support to the 
Syrian regime.’ The latest measures have practically cut off the official state-owned 
banks from international financial markets and transactions. These sanctions prohibit 
the opening of bank accounts with Syrian credit or financial institutions, or 
representative offices, branches or subsidiaries in Syria. By doing so, the US and the 
EU technically banned the supply of any type of financial services to the Syrian 
banking sector, forcing Syrian banks to turn to non-dollar transactions22. In response 
to these actions by Western countries, the staunchest supporter of Damascus, Moscow 
authorised Syria's central bank in December 2011 to open accounts in Russian roubles 
with several Russian banks. This announcement intended to show Russia’s 
determination to stand behind its ally and its unequivocal stance to undercut and 
circumvent Western sanctions, after prohibiting Syrian banks from doing business in 
US dollars23. 
 
Following its economic blockade against several Syrian banks, the EU went after the 
Governor of Central Bank of Syria, Adib Mayaleh, and added him to the sanctions 
list24 on 15 May 2012. The EU’s reason for including him in these sanctions as per its 
announcement is for his responsibility ‘for providing economic and financial support 
to the Syrian regime’ through his role as the governor of the bank.  
 
Fully aware of the continuing international sanctions against public banks and the 
corroding impact this will have on these financial institutions, the government has 
been painstakingly trying to find alternatives to its conundrum25. In July 2014, the 
Directorate of Planning at the Ministry of Economy and Trade reviewed a set of 
proposals to revamp the banking sector in the country. The Committee for Financial 
and Banking Sector1 has developed a set of proposals to restructure state-owned banks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  Committee	  for	  Financial	  and	  the	  Banking	  Sector	  is	  a	  unit	  at	  the	  Higher	  Commission	  for	  Scientific	  
Research,	  which	  was	  established	  in	  2005	  to	  provide	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  the	  government.	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and diversify their services and products. A part of this restructuring plan is the 
prospect of transforming state-owned banks into joint stock companies owned by the 
state, with their shares traded on the Damascus Stock Exchange. Amid the depleting 
investments in the country by both the public and private sectors, the government is 
keen on attracting local and foreign cash to be deposited and invested in local banks.  
 
Meanwhile, Syrian businessmen have also been lobbying the government to attract 
Russian banks to establish subsidiaries and branches in the country to strengthen the 
financial relationship with these banks. The Chairman of the Syrian-Russian Business 
Council, Samer Othman, also suggested direct coordination between the central banks 
of the two countries to facilitate bilateral trade and currency transactions. Also, the 
Deputy Chairman of Damascus Chamber of Commerce, Bahaa al-Din Hasan, has been 
discussing the establishment of a joint Russian-Syrian bank by investors from both 
countries, and to open subsidiaries and branches in other countries to enable financial 
and currency transactions in the hope of circumventing Western sanctions.  
 
Besides the rhetoric and statements coming from state officials and businessmen close 
to the regime, the possibility of implementing such projects are not just costly but the 
high operational risks will make such proposals hard to fathom at this stage of the 
conflict. On the other hand, trade between the two countries has been insignificant 
despite the substantial support Russia has provided to the Syrian regime, in its 
different forms. According to the pro-government al-Watan newspaper, trade between 
the two countries reached only $2 billion, probably in the form of assistance from 
Russia.  
 
4. Investment opportunities attract Arab capital 
   The increasing isolation of the Syrian regime by the US and European countries 
after the Syrian rejection of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Syrian 
interference in Lebanese domestic politics, made it highly dependent on investments 
from the Gulf region. Between the years 2005 and 2011, Syria witnessed a substantial 
inflow of foreign capital primarily from Gulf countries, that started investing billions 
of US dollars in mega-projects in the real estate and tourism sectors - aside from 
banking and insurance26. Various Gulf-based conglomerates, especially from the 
UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, flocked to Syria with tremendous amounts of cash to 
participate in the booming real estate development, tourism, banking and financial 
services with limited participation in infrastructure and light industrial projects.  
 
Prominent Gulf corporations and businessmen became partners in landmark hotels, 
resorts, and residential and commercial developments worth more than $20 billion 
with Syrian businessmen, some of which were close to the Syrian regime27. Some of 
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these were the Saudi Arabian Prince Walid bin Talal, Bin Laden Group and Al-Oula 
Holding; the Emirati government-owned Emaar Properties, Majid Al-Futtaim, Belhasa 
International, Bonyan International for Investment and Emirates Investment & 
Development Company; the Kuwaiti Al-Kharafi Group, Al-Fayha kuwait, Aref Group 
and Al-Madina for Finance & Investment; the Qatari Diar and Venicia Group. They 
invested in big-ticket projects such as Damascus Four Seasons Hotel, Damascus 
Eighth Gate, Five Chams in Yafour, Kiwan Tourism, Sheraton Hotel Aleppo, 
Damascus Financial City, Cordoba, Bonyan Syria, Rotana Gardenia Homs and Ibn 
Hani Resort Lattakia, among many others. Following the outset of protests in the 
country, several of these companies and investors suspended their operations. Others 
divested their investments following the decision of the majority of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to isolate the Syrian regime, cut their 
diplomatic ties and impose sanctions against it. 
 
The decades-long rift between the Syrian regime – under both Assads – and Western 
countries, especially the United States, led to diplomatic and economic isolation of the 
country. The pariah status that was conferred on Syria increased the commercial risks 
to international investors to consider the country as part of their emerging or frontier 
market investment portfolio. Also, the uncertainty surrounding regulatory, institutional 
and policy frameworks in the financial system failed to instil sufficient investors’ 
confidence to operate in such a highly statist environment. That said, regional Arab 
banks that share similar cultural and traditional backgrounds were more eager to take a 
leap of faith and invest in a largely underdeveloped banking sector and an unbanked 
population of 21 million. The majority came from banks next door in Lebanon and 
Jordan, but others from GCC countries from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and 
Bahrain have also joined the fray.  
 
Also, the long decades of archaic and inefficient government-controlled banking 
sector accompanied with inadequate financial and business education system, 
underdeveloped human capital and risk-averse business class meant that help should 
come from outside. Regional financial institutions with international banking 
standards, foreign capital looking for overseas investment opportunities and seasoned 
bankers found a rare window following the opening of the financial system in Syria. 
Lebanese, Jordanian and Gulf banks from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and 
Bahrain started establishing their subsidiaries in the country to tap the largely cash 
economy and offer their retail and corporate banking services.  
 
The diagram below maps private-owned banks in Syria, both conventional and Islamic 
(Exhibit 2). 
 




     The Qatari government and investors have had the largest appetite to invest in the 
Syrian economy, including the banking sector, as part of their international investment 
portfolio. Notwithstanding their relatively late entry into the Syrian privatised 
financial system in 2007, they established two banks in Syria, one of which is the 
largest private banks in the country by market capitalisation.  
 
Below is a diagram mapping the strategic investments by Qatari banks in Syria 
(Exhibit 3). 
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Qatar National Bank-Syria (QNBS) is the subsidiary of the Doha-based Qatar National 
Bank (QNB) that started its operations in November 2009. It is the largest private bank 
by market capitalisation with a total paid-up capital of SYP 15 billion ($333 million in 
pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $100 million based on 2014 average official 
exchange rate of 151USD/SYP) – which makes up a modest proportion of 20% of the 
largest state-owned bank CBS. The bank was listed on DSE in April 2010 and 
operates in the country through 15 branches. QNB is one of the major foreign 
institutional investors, which still plays an important role in the Syrian banking 
sector28. QNB is the majority shareholder of QNBS with 50.81%, according to the 
bank’s corporate filings with the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets & 
Securities (SCFMS) 29. The remaining ownership stake is divided among several 
Syrian investors including the state-owned General Social Security Organisation 
(10.28%), Engineers’ Syndicate (5%), and the both Western-sanctioned state-owned 
Savings Bank (4.11%) and Popular Credit Bank (see section 3 for more details). The 
bank reported in November 2014 that the director Khalaf al-Abdullah, who 
represented the General Social Security Organisation on the board, had resigned from 
his position after he had been appointed the Minister of Labour in the new Syrian 
cabinet. On the security front, some of the bank’s branches sustained physical 
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damages, robberies and fraud due to the ongoing violence, especially in cities and 
regions outside government control.  
 
The second Qatari bank is Syria International Islamic Bank (SIIB), the subsidiary of 
the Doha-based Qatar International Islamic Bank (QIIB), which owns 30% of the 
bank’s shares, according to the bank’s website30. SIIB started its operations in 
September 2007 with a total paid-up capital of SYP 8.5 billion ($188.88 million in 
pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $56.29 million based on 2014 average 
official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP). The bank was listed on DSE in May 2009 
and operates in the country through 23 branches. Besides QIIB’s 30% ownership 
stake, 12 Qatari institutional and individual investors collectively own 19% of the 
bank’s shares. These are Burooq Trading Company (5%), Sheikh Thani Abdullah bin 
Thani al-Thani (5%), Islamic Insurance Company of Qatar (3%), Private Projects 
Company (2.5%), Yousuf Hussen Kamal (1%) and several members of al-Thani royal 
family. Several Syrian institutional and individual investors own the remaining 51%, 
according to the bank’s corporate filings with SCFMS31, including Arab Union 
Reinsurance Company, Syrian Libyan Company for Industrial & Agricultural 
Investments, Ahmed Muhammed Nahhas and Mohammed Abdulraaouf Qudsi, among 
other prominent Syrian businessmen. The state-owned General Social Security 
Organisation also owns 0.23% stake in the bank with a representative member on the 
bank’s board of directors. 
 
Ihab Muhammed Makhlouf, Rami’s brother and the maternal cousin of the Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad, was a shareholder and member of the board of directors of 
the bank. Following the beginning of protests in March 2011, which largely 
denounced the concentration of economic power and overreach of Makhlouf’s family 
in the Syrian economy, Ihab appears to have divested from the bank, announcing his 
resignation in May 201132. Rami Makhlouf33 is the 44-year-old first maternal cousin 
of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the son of Mohammed, a former senior 
commander of the elite Syrian Republican Guard. Since the ascendance of Bashar al-
Assad to power in 2000, Rami became the symbol of the emerging crony capitalism in 
the country and was widely known in Syria and among business circles of his deep 
involvement and control of the Syrian economy through a growing web of businesses 
and holding companies. His business empire spanned telecommunication, oil and gas, 
banking, airlines, construction and real estate, tourism and retail. One of his main 
investment vehicles that emerged in 2006 is Cham Holding2, one of the biggest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Cham	  Holding	   is	  one	  of	   the	   largest	  Syrian	  companies	   founded	   in	  2006	  by	  several	  prominent	  Syrian	  
businessmen	   including	   Rami	   Makhlouf,	   who	   was	   one	   of	   its	   major	   shareholders.	   The	   conglomerate	  
company	  was	  established	  with	  a	  $365m	  capital	  during	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Syrian	  regime	  moved	  towards	  
market	  liberalisation	  and	  increased	  participation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  major	  economic	  projects	  and	  
activities.	  Cham	  Holding	  was	  added	  to	  the	  US	  sanction	  list	  in	  May	  2011.	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companies in Syria in terms of capitalisation. The holding company brought together 
many of the most affluent and influential businessmen in Syria, who had traditional 
business and family links with the country’s political elite. Makhlouf was added to the 
US sanction list in February 2008 34  for amassing ‘his commercial empire by 
exploiting his relationships with Syrian regime members…who benefits from and aids 
the public corruption’, according to the US Department of the Treasury. 
 
SIIB was subject to US and EU sanctions35 on 26 June 2012 after being accused of 
acting as a ‘front for the Commercial Bank of Syria’, which was blacklisted in 2006 
and again in 2011. According to the EU decision published on the case, this 
relationship ‘has allowed the bank to circumvent sanctions imposed on it by the EU’. 
The Council’s reason for adding the bank had been that the bank provided financial 
support to the Syrian regime and helped the Commercial Bank of Syria to circumvent 
the economic blockade on the Commercial Bank of Syria and Syrian Lebanese 
Commercial Bank. The statement goes on to say that ‘from 2011 to 2012, SIIB 
surreptitiously facilitated financing worth almost $150 million on behalf of the 
Commercial Bank of Syria’. However, in June 2014, the General Court of the 
European Union ruled in favour of SIIB, which was until then on the EU sanctions 
list36. The Court found that the Council of the EU had erred in deciding that SIIB 
should be added to the list of people and companies subject to restrictive measures in 
June 2012. The Court held that the Council did not have any evidence that the bank 
had assisted either of those commercial banks with transactions involving sanctioned 
people and entities, and the fact that the bank had been sanctioned by OFAC37 (the US 
Office of Foreign Asset Control) was not relevant. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the Qatari government owns 50% of the Doha-based QNB 
through the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), in turn owned by the Qatari 
government, according to the bank’s website 38 . Similar to QNB, the Qatari 
government is also one of the major shareholders and owns a significant percentage of 
the Doha-based QIIB with 17% through QIA, according to corporate databases. 
Therefore, the Qatari government has an indirect ownership stake in the two Syrian 
subsidiaries, QNBS and SIIB. Despite the raging civil war and the uncompromising 
hostile stance taken by the Qatari Al-Thani ruling family against the Syrian regime, 
the Qatari government and investors appear to have followed their economic interests 
by maintaining their investments in the banking sector39. It is also surprising that the 
Syrian regime did not take any adverse measures by expropriating the Qataris’ 
shareholdings, despite the regime’s aggressive campaign against the al-Thani family. 
Qatar is the opposition’s biggest financial and military supporter, and was one of the 
first countries to recognise the Syrian opposition after it had cut its diplomatic ties 
with the regime. In a symbolic gesture in March 2013, it was the only country to allow 
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Assad’s opponents to run the Syrian embassy in Doha after declaring the diplomats 
personae non gratae. Qatar’s call for regime change in Syria and their leading 
assistance to Assad’s enemies have been considered a personal insult to Bashar al-
Assad, who wasn't long ago, a regular guest of the emir in Doha. This previous 
personal relationship between the ruling families in both countries translated in 
substantial investments of more than $5 billion by Qatar in the Syrian economy, 
spanning tourism, real estate and energy projects.     
 
4.2. Lebanon 
     Several Lebanese banks have also been predominant investors in the country, with 
some of their prominent financial institutions opening subsidiaries in Syria. The 
Lebanese financial sector has for decades benefited from Syrian businessmen who 
conducted their international business transactions and trade through Lebanese banks 
who were better integrated in the international financial markets. Also, the Syrian elite 
have long treated Lebanese banks as a safe haven by keeping their deposits there for 
fear of sudden expropriation or nationalisation by the Syrian government. Besides 
their reliance on its comparatively sophisticated banking system, Syrian businessmen 
long saw the Lebanese liberal economy as a future model for how Syria could become. 
After announcing the new changes in the Syrian financial system, the shortage of 
adequate local bankers have also opened a golden opportunity for Lebanese 
professionals to manage and train the new cohort of Syrian bankers in the newly-
established banks with generous compensation packages and elevated social stature in 
Syria. Thus, Lebanon and Syria have always benefited from their special relations and 
the close links among their businessmen. On the backdrop of these competitive 
advantages, Lebanon has the biggest number of banks in Syria, with five subsidiaries 
operating in the country. 
 
The diagram below maps the strategic investments by Lebanese banks in Syria 
(Exhibit 4). 
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The largest Lebanese bank operating in Syria is Bank Byblos-Syria, established in 
2005 with a capital of SYP 6.12 billion ($136 million in pre-conflict value terms 
45USD/SYP and $40.53 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP) and is the subsidiary of the Lebanese Byblos Bank SAL. At the time of 
its establishment and until at least November 2011, it had 41.5% ownership stake40. 
During the third quarter of 2011, after more than six months into the Syrian uprising, 
the bank increased its ownership stake to 52.37%41 to become the majority shareholder 
of its subsidiary. The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) – the 
multilateral development institution of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) – was also one of the major investors in the bank with a 7.5% stake 
ownership until July 2014. The majority shareholder Lebanese Byblos Bank SAL 
announced on 25 September 2014 in its filings to the stock exchange that it had 
acquired OPEC’s stake in the bank and that the Fund’s representative on the board of 
directors had resigned. This in turn has increased the bank’s parent shareholdings to 
59.81%.  Other noteworthy investors and board directors in the bank are the Syrians 
Nader Muhammed Qal'i, Muhammad Murtada al-Dandachi, Almo'taz Wasef Sawaf, 
Samir Anis Hasan and Andre Abou Hamad.  
 
Rami Makhlouf was also an investor in the bank before 201142 with 4.99%43, but it 
was not clear from the bank’s disclosures if he is still associated with the bank. 
Besides his blacklisting by the US in 2008, Rami – the cousin of President Bashar al-
Assad – was added to the EU sanction list in May 2011 for ‘furnishing finance and 
support to the regime’44. In order for the bank to insulate itself from potential 
economic blockades, it removed the name of Rami from the published lists of its 
shareholders. According to Executive Magazine, the UK-based Bankers’ Almanac – 
which publishes the details of shareholders of banks globally – was asked in January 
2012 by the Lebanese Byblos Bank to ‘change the ownership details to their current 
Syria	  Studies	   	   	   	  16	  
listing’. The manager of Financial Markets Division at Byblos said ‘the bank had 
recently tried to evict him [Rami] as a shareholder, but Makhlouf had refused’45. 
 
The second-largest Lebanese bank is Audi Bank-Syria with a paid-up capital of SYP 
5.72 billion ($127.11 million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $37.88 
million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP), It was 
established in 2005 and is the subsidiary of the leading financial institution in 
Lebanon, Banque Audi SAL. The parent bank owns 41% stake of its subsidiary46, and 
its shareholding did not change since its establishment nine years ago, contrary to its 
competitors. While the bank did not exit the country despite the deteriorating 
economic conditions, it did not alter its commercial interest either47. Other Lebanese 
financial institutions and companies have also invested in the bank since its inception. 
Both Audi Saradar Investment Bank and Lebanon Invest hold 3% each of the bank’s 
shares. On the Syrian side, there are prominent businessmen who are both 
shareholders and members of the board of directors. Some of which are Ahmad al-
Abboud, Adnan Takla, Rana al-Zein and George Jad’oun al-Achi. Bassel Hamwi was 
the bank’s CEO until his resignation in December 2013, yet he remains a shareholder 
with 3.07% stake and a board director48. The London-based Syrian businessman 
Ayman Asfari was a shareholder with 2% stake, based on Syrian corporate databases 
published in December 201049. Mr Asfari is the CEO of Petrofac, one of the global oil 
and gas services companies, listed on the FTSE-100. It is not clear if Mr Asfari is still 
associated with the bank after 2011, as the bank’s disclosures only list the major 
shareholders who are also members of the board of directors. 
 
Fransabank-Syria is the third largest Lebanese bank and the last one to enter the 
Syrian market in late 2008. It has a paid-up capital of SYP 4.2 billion ($93.33 million 
in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $27.81 million based on 2014 average 
official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP) and is the subsidiary of Fransabank SAL, one 
of the largest banks in Lebanon, which is the strategic investor with 55.66% of its 
Syrian subsidiary50. The Lebanese banker Adel Wafic Kassar – the Deputy Chairman 
of the Lebanese parent bank – is a shareholder of the Syrian subsidiary, where he acts 
as the Chairman. The remaining major investors of the bank are mostly Syrian 
businessmen such as Ahmad Said Al-Shihabi, Eli Fath Allah al-Sioufi, Sami Youssef 
al-Rabbat, Ali Wahib Mer’ei and Thaer al-Lahham. In an unprecedented move among 
Syrian private banks, Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi (BBSF) purchased 4.23% of its 
Lebanese competitor Fransabank-Syria’s shares on 19 August 201451. In the bank’s 
disclosures52, it pointed out that this is merely a financial investment in the bank and 
BBSF will not be involved in any strategy setting or decision making in its investee.  
 
Banque du Liban et d'Outre-Mer (BLOM) was the first Lebanese bank to establish its 
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subsidiary in Syria, namely Bank of Syria & Overseas (BSO) in late 2003. 
Notwithstanding its early entry into the country, it is one of the smaller private banks 
with a paid-up capital of SYP 4 billion ($88.89 million in pre-conflict value terms 
45USD/SYP and $26.49 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP). BLOM is the major shareholder of the bank with 49% ownership 
stake. Several members of Azhari family – who are majority owners in BLOM – are 
also shareholders in BSO who sit on its board of directors53. Other Syrian investors 
who also sit on the board are the prominent businessman and Chairman of the bank 
Rateb al-Shallah (1.25%), Ihsan al-Baalbaki (5%), Nada Ibrahim Sheikh Dib (1.56%), 
Iyad Habib Beitinjaneh (0.62%) and Fahd Taher Tafnakji (0.49%). Several of the 
bank’s branches in Homs and Hama were the target of armed robberies, costing the 
bank millions of Syrian pounds. It is worth pointing out that the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) – the subsidiary of the World Bank focused on investing in private 
sector development in developing countries – owned 10% of the bank’s equity54. The 
IFC’s website mentions55 that ‘in light of the deteriorating security situation, IFC’s 
operational activity in Syria was suspended in March 2011’. Therefore, it appears that 
it has subsequently divested from bank and explains that ‘IFC has taken an equity 
position – now sold - in Bank of Syria and Overseas (BSO)’. 
 
Bank Al-Sharq is the smallest bank, both compared to Lebanese and other private 
banks, and was established in 2008, with a paid-up capital of SYP 2.5 billion ($55.56 
million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $16.55 million based on 2014 
average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP). It is the subsidiary of the Lebanese 
Banque Libano-Francaise (BLF), which owns 49% of the bank’s shares, based on the 
bank’s website and corporate filings56. A major Syrian investor in the bank is Khalil 
Boulos Georges Sara who owns 30.5% of the bank’s shares. The bank has several 
other Syrian investors sitting on its board of directors such as Salim al-Challah, Najib 
al-Barazi and George Antaki. It also includes controversial Syrian businessmen, who 
are accused of enabling the regime’s crackdown by financing some of its operations, 
such as Naji Chaoui57. The EU sanctioned58 the son of Naji Chaoui, George, on 14 
November 2011 for his membership of the Syrian Electronic Army – an outfit 
established to identify and disrupt anti-government activity and activists inside and 
outside the country. Another reason for the decision to blacklist him is his 
involvement ‘in the violent crackdown and call for violence against the civilian 
population across Syria’. Following these sanctions, several members of the board of 
directors have resigned from the bank in the past three years, as per the bank’s 
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4.3. Jordan 
     The Jordanian financial sector is a long established one that boasts well-capitalised 
and managed financial institutions. Three Jordanian banks have set up shop since 
private banks were allowed to operate in Syria.  
 
The diagram below maps the strategic investments of Jordanian banks in Syria 
(Exhibit 5). 
 
The largest Jordanian bank in Syria is the International Bank for Trade & Finance 
(IBTF), and is one of the first private banks to be registered in the country in 
December 2003. It is an affiliate of the Jordanian Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance, which is a major shareholder with 49.06% stake60. IBTF has a paid-up capital 
of SYP 5.25 billion ($116.67 million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and 
$34.76 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP) and 
operates in the country through 30 branches. The government-affiliated Engineers’ 
Syndicate and private Syrian Libyan Company for Industrial & Agricultural 
Investments each own 2.23% of total shares. Other Syrian investors are Nader 
Haddad, George Tafankji, Mustafa al-Kafri and Amer Hosni Lotfi, who is the Deputy 
Chairman of the board and has served as the head of the State Planning Commission. 
Since the start of the conflict, the bank suffered from several incidents of robbery and 
physical damage against its branches61. 
 
 
Syria	  Studies	   	   	   	  19	  
Arab Bank-Syria is the second largest Jordanian bank in terms of capitalisation with 
SYP 5.05 billion ($112.2 million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $33.45 
million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP), founded in 
2005. It is the subsidiary of the Jordan-based Arab Bank, one of the oldest and largest 
financial institutions in the Arab World, which is a majority shareholder of the bank 
with 51.28%62. Several prominent Syrian businessmen are partners in the bank, where 
they also sit on the board of directors; Samer Salah Daniel, Ahmad Rahif al-Atassi, 
Hassan Ihsan al-Baalbaki, Muhammed Yassin Rabah and Mohammed Abdulsalam 
Haykal. The bank’s disclosures identify several cases of reported theft against its 
branches in the embattled cities of Homs and Daraa where substantial sums of cash 
were stolen from the branches’ treasury.  
 
In September 2014, the Arab Bank has made international headlines63 after it was 
found to be guilty for ‘knowingly supporting terrorism efforts’ in a high profile 
terrorism trial in the US Federal District Court in Brooklyn, simply referred to as 
‘Beirut Account’ case. What is unique about this case is being the first civil lawsuit 
against a bank under the US Anti-Terrorism Act, spurring disagreements among 
different branches of the US government and the government of Jordan, where the 
bank is headquartered. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, who represent 297 American and Israeli 
family members whose relatives were killed in 24 Hamas attacks in early 2000s – 
during the second Palestinian Intifada – accuse the bank of operating a ‘shadowy 
network that finances terrorists’, with reference to the Palestinian Hamas group. At the 
crux of this trial, is the account of Osama Hamdan, a spokesman for Hamas, at Arab 
Bank’s branch in Beirut. This account is accused of acting as a social security system 
for relatives of Hamas’ members who collected charitable funds after their relatives’ 
deaths in security operations against Israel. In turn, the Arab Bank vehemently 
contended that it complied with anti-terrorism financing and money-laundering laws 
by screening for accounts against lists of individuals and organisations designated as 
terrorists. When Hamdan was added to one of the terrorist lists in 2003, the bank 
claims it closed the bank account. However, compliance with foreign bank secrecy 
laws has also prevented the bank from submitting critical documents to substantiate 
their claims. Considering the complicated and sensitive nature of the case, the US 
Supreme Court sought the guidance of several departments in the US administration, 
but that was not an easy accomplishment. The US State Department, aware of the 
importance of Jordan as a strategic ally in a turbulent Middle East, sided with the Arab 
Bank. The Justice Department’s national security division did not want to intervene 
against American victims of terrorist attacks. Yet, officials at the Treasury Department 
took the side of the plaintiffs thanks to their efforts to clamp down on tax evasion 
through foreign accounts. The Jordanian government showed its displeasure at the 
course of events, saying that ‘forcing the Arab Bank to stand trial under the sanctions 
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order could harm the bank’s economic and reputational standing, and could lead to 
economic and political instability in a region that can ill afford any more of either’. 
Despite the political and legal sensitivities surrounding the case, the final verdict has 
put to rest these disagreements. The ruling against the bank will have a substantial 
impact on the bank’s reputation and will further undercut its global operations in the 
US and Europe. Also, the verdict will serve as a benchmark on similar legal cases to 
hold banks and financial institutions responsible for wrongdoing by their clients, even 
if they had followed banking rules. This ruling can also be seen as a deterrent for 
banks that conduct business in high-risk countries, such as Syria, on issues related to 
sanctions, terrorism financing and bribery. 
 
Less controversial is the Bank of Jordan-Syria, relatively one of the smaller financial 
institutions in the Syrian banking sector, with a paid-up capital of SYP 3 billion 
($66.67 million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $19.87 million based on 
2014 average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP). It was established in 2008 and 
is the subsidiary of the eponymous Amman-based Bank of Jordan, which owns almost 
half of the bank’s shares with 49% stake64. There are several Syrian investors who also 
serve on the board of directors, including Abdul Aziz Rashid al-Sukhni, Mohammad 
Nizar Haroun, Ibrahim Shehadeh Najmeh and Muhammed Maher Arabi Katbi. 
Several members of the Al-Akhras family, related to Asmaa al-Akhras the wife of 
President Bashar al-Assad, have also been prominent investors in the bank and 
members of the board of directors. The bank’s corporate filings show that Diana Tarif 
al-Akhras was an investor and a board member until July 201265. However, her 
brother Mohammad Murhaf al-Akhras remains a board member and an investor with a 
5% ownership stake, according to the bank’s corporate filings for the third quarter of 
2014. The father of Nora al-Akhras, Tarif, who is the parental uncle of Asma al-
Assad, was added to the EU sanction’s list in September 201166. The reasons included 
Tarif’s ‘close business relations with President al-Assad's family’, which afforded him 
to ‘benefit from the regime’, according to the EU’s published decision. Furthermore, 
he is accused by the same document of providing ‘industrial and residential premises 
for improvised detention camps, as well as logistical support for the regime (buses and 
tank loaders)’.  
 
4.4. Saudi Arabia 
Unlike banks from other countries, only one Saudi Arabia-based bank decided to enter 
the Syrian financial sector, but it was the first foreign private bank to be established in 
Syria in late 2003.  
 
The diagram below maps the strategic investment made by the sole Saudi Arabian 
bank in Syria until late 2011(Exhibit 6). 
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At the time of its establishment in late 2003, Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi (BBSF) was 
the subsidiary of the Saudi Arabia-based Banque Saudi Fransi (BSF), which is partly 
owned by Crédit Agricole of France. It is the seventh largest private bank in Syria 
with a paid-up capital of SYP 5 billion ($111 million in pre-conflict value terms 
45USD/SYP and $33.11 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP), operating through 38 branches in the country. At the time it was set up 
and until late 201167, BSF was the strategic investor and one of the major shareholders 
with 27% ownership stake, while Lebanon’s Banque Européenne du Moyen Orient 
(BEMO) owns 22% of total shares. Several Syrian investors have major commercial 
interest in the bank who also serve on the board of directors, including Riyad and 
Yordan Bshara Obegi, Mahran Hazar, Farid Talal al-Khouri, Noor Faisal al-Husseini, 
Bassam Mamdouh Mu’mari, Rana Hamdi al-Za’im and Riyad Muhammed al-
Basatneh. Similar to its competitors, the bank also incurred considerable losses due to 
a spate of robberies, heists, embezzlement, fraud and physical destruction sustained by 
some of its branches in hot zones in the country.  
 
In November 201168, BSF, the bank’s strategic investor and one of the major bank’s 
shareholders sold its 27% stake in Syria’s BBSF, stating that ‘the financial risks in 
Syria justify its decision to withdraw’. In addition, the bank sold its 10% holding in 
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BEMO, which owns 22% of the Syrian bank’s equity. The announcement came two 
days before the Arab League had approved sanctions, including a ban on financial 
dealings with the Central Bank of Syria and the state-owned CBS. The decision to 
divest from the bank made BSF the first and only foreign bank to exit the country due 
to the political upheaval. Similar to the decision of BSF to exit the country, it was 
expected that Qatari banks would follow suit given the prominent role that the Qatari 
government had played in cranking up political and economic pressure on the Syrian 
regime. Yet Qatari shareholders maintained their shareholdings in these banks in 
contrast to the Saudi decision to exit the country. 
 
4.5. Kuwait 
Similar to its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia, only one Kuwaiti bank decided to enter 
the Syrian financial sector but it was the first Islamic bank to start its operations in the 
country in 2006.  
 
The diagram below maps the strategic investments by the only Kuwaiti Islamic bank 
in Syria (Exhibit 7). 
 
Cham Bank is the eighth largest financial institution and the first Islamic bank in 
Syria, which was established in 2006 with a paid-up capital of SYP 5 billion ($111 
million in pre-conflict value terms 45USD/SYP and $33.11 million based on 2014 
average official exchange rate of 151USD/SYP). It has several Kuwaiti institutional 
investors with the Commercial Bank of Kuwait being the largest shareholder and 
strategic investor with 32%69. Other Kuwaiti investors include Securities Group 
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Company, Al-Shall Investment Company and Kuwait United Investment Company. 
Their exact ownership stake was not available in the bank’s corporate filings because 
their representatives are not members of the board of directors. The Islamic 
Development Bank, affiliated with the Arab League, is also a significant shareholder 
in the Islamic bank with 9% stake, whose representative is a board director. Several 
Syrian organisations and individuals also own considerable percentage of the bank. To 
illustrate, the Syrian government-affiliated pension fund of Engineers’ Syndicate holds 
2% of the bank’s shares. Meanwhile, several Syrian businessmen are also shareholders 
who sit on the board of directors such as Ali Mahran Khwanda (3%), Osama al-Taher 
(0.3%) and Ahmad Kuzbari (5%), the son of the Syrian-Austrian Nabil Rafik Kuzbari 
who was added to the US sanctions list in May 2011 for his ties to Rami Makhlouf70, 
but was later delisted in April 2013 for severing these ties, according to official 
documents71. The listing was the result of Kuzbari’s investment and chairmanship of 
Cham Holding, after which he severed his ties with it by leaving the company72. 
Separately, the bank’s branch in Homs suffered a robbery and sustained physical 
damage in September 2012 after perpetrators tried to burn the branch73.  
 
4.6. Bahrain 
     Two important financial institutions from the tiny Gulf country Bahrain, were also 
the main founders of two Syrian banks, one is a traditional commercial bank and the 
other is Islamic. 
 
The diagram below maps the strategic investments by the two Bahraini banks in Syria 
(Exhibit 8). 
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Al-Baraka Bank Syria is an Islamic bank that was the last to enter the Syrian financial 
sector in 2010 and to be listed on DSE in September 2014. It is the ninth largest 
private bank with a paid-up capital of SYP 4.55 billion ($101.1 million in pre-conflict 
value terms 45USD/SYP and $30.13 million based on 2014 average official exchange 
rate of 151USD/SYP) and is part of the Bahrain-based Islamic Al-Baraka Banking 
Group, which owns 23% of the bank’s equity 74 . Other GCC-based financial 
institutions and corporations also have commercial interests in the Islamic bank. To 
illustrate, the UAE-based Emirates Islamic Bank is another investor with 10% 
shareholdings. The Kuwaiti-Syrian Holding Company owns 5% of the bank’s stock 
while several well-established Syrian businessmen have invested in the relatively new 
bank. Some of these investors who also serve as board members are Mohammad Badr 
Eddin Al-Shaer, Ghassan Sukkar, Mohammed Imad Mawlawi, Basem Al-Taji and 
AbdulSalam al-Shawaf. Since early 2014, Al-Baraka Bank Syria had been making the 
necessary arrangements to list its shares on the DSE in September 2014, making it the 
last private bank to join the stock exchange75. 
 
The second Bahrain-affiliated Syrian bank is Syria Gulf Bank (SGB) that is the 
subsidiary of the Bahraini United Gulf Bank (UGB). It was established in 2006 with a 
paid-up capital of SYP 3 billion ($66.67 million in pre-conflict value terms 
45USD/SYP and $19.87 million based on 2014 average official exchange rate of 
151USD/SYP). UGB is the major shareholder of the bank and strategic investor with 
31% ownership stake76. The Kuwaiti Al-Fouttouh Investment Company is also one of 
the major shareholders of the bank with 11% stake. Other noteworthy investors are 
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Syrian businessmen such as, Karim Mahran Khwanda, Muhammed Atman Orabi 
Kassab-Bashi, Nazriat Pouzant Yacoubian, Abdulwahab Zahed Sawwan and his son 
Muhammed Sawwan. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, several board members 
and investors resigned or divested from the bank77 to preempt any potential economic 
blockade by Western countries. Also, SGB’s branch in the northern-eastern city of 
Deir Azzour, which witnessed substantial clashes and is now largely under the control 
of ISIL, suffered an armed robbery of the cash deposited in the bank. To finance its 
operations, ISIL has been especially active in targeting banks and other financial 
institutions, which are usually in possession of large quantities of cash. 
 
5. Impact of sanctions on investments in the banking sector 
5.1. The link between the political elite and regime businessmen 
     The emergence of the private banking sector in Syria has attracted institutional and 
retail investors’ as part of their diversification strategy. Investments in this sector 
proved a lucrative venture to many investors, which had the potential to grow at an 
exponential rate had it not been for the Syrian conflict. Currently, there are more than 
23 individual investors whose shareholdings exceed the one million shares threshold, 
with a total stock ownership of 36.4 million shares. This constitutes more than 4.5% of 
overall shares of private banks and 11% of total retail investors’ stock ownership in 
these banks. These investors are prominent members of the Syrian business 
community, some of which have close ties to the Syrian regime78. 
 
Since the late 1980s, the links between the military, security and political elite on one 
hand and the business community in Damascus and Aleppo have strengthened thanks 
to joint business ventures and inter-family marriages. The end of the cold war and the 
declining strategic aid flow from regional and international allies prompted Hafez al-
Assad to reverse some of the socialist redistributive policies enacted during the 1960s 
and 1970s. By the early 1980s, Syria’s state building had reached a plateau, almost 
depleting the state treasury amid increasing external debt forcing the government to 
reconsider its populist policies. The growing pressure to keep the state-led economy 
afloat forced the country into a new phase of moderate opening of the economy 
towards the private sector and foreign capital, in what was widely dubbed Infitah79. 
New state bourgeoisies subsequently emerged, who benefitted from economic 
liberalisation and became heavily dependent on government contracts, establishing a 
clientelistic relationship with the state. The private sector also started gaining some of 
its lost ground by being allowed to take part in infrastructure projects and external 
trade, as the state rolled back its welfare measures and monopoly over the economy.  
 
Since 2000, when Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Syria’s oil revenue from local 
production had reached its apex at 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1996, and starting 
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on a gradual course of decline hitting 500,000 bpd in 2001 and 400,000 in 2010. This 
oil production decline was taking place at a time when consumption was rising 
steadily on an annual basis from 100,000 bpd to 320,000 in 2010. The government had 
few options but to further liberalise the economy, on the back drop of the previous 
attempt in the 1990s, which gave the private sector more opportunities in the 
economy. In tandem, Bashar departed from his father’s policy by forcing the Sunni old 
guard politicians from the inner circle out and curbing the role of members from the 
ruling Baath party, labour unions and farmers. Instead, Bashar embarked on a new 
mission by concentrating new powers within the extended Assad family and other 
trusted individuals. In order to compensate for the waning influence among the wider 
traditional base of the regime’s support, Bashar forged new relations with the business 
elite. Bashar relied on co-opting the business elite and their relationship grew even 
closer in the last decade and transformed into a de facto alliance, to become the central 
backbone of the Syrian regime80. Before the 2011 Syrian uprising, this alliance 
became the new economic and business model in Syria, in what was described as 
’crony capitalism’, practically merging these two distinct socio-economic groups into 
a closely-knit but all-powerful ruling class81. This has driven the emergence of a new 
generation of ‘regime businessmen’, who are members of key families with a diverse 
range of investments in several sectors, including banking and finance, real estate 
development, tourism and entertainment.  
 
5.2. Private investors 
     Because of the close linkages between business and politics in the country, the 
sanctions aimed at disrupting this dynamic and driving a wedge between these closely 
forged relationships. Dozens of security officials, politicians and businessmen were 
added to the US and EU sanction list in the hope of driving them away from the 
regime. This policy has largely failed, since most of these businessmen have 
substantial investments in the country, which outweighed their overseas assets and 
commercial interests. Hence, the majority remained highly invested in the survival of 
the regime and more than three years of biting sanctions against them did not result in 
any decision to abandon the regime. A case in point is Issam Anbouba, the president 
of Anbouba for Agricultural Industries Company, a major shareholder in several 
private banks in the country. He was added to the EU sanctions list on 2 September 
2011 for ‘providing financial support for the repressive apparatus and the paramilitary 
groups exerting violence against the civil population in Syria’, according to the 
published EU decision document. Specifically, he is accused of ‘providing property 
such as premises and warehouses for improvised detention centres’. Blacklisting him 
has demonstrably failed to change his stance towards the conflict and abandon the 
regime in its fight against its opponents.  
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One name stands out in the retail investor’s category, Muhammad Suleiman Tlass 
Ferzat, who is the largest owner of shares in private banks, spread along three banks, 
QNBS, Cham Bank and Bank Al-Sharq. The second largest retail investor is Samer 
Salah Daniel, who is one of the principal shareholders at Arab Bank-Syria, with 5% 
stock ownership of the bank. In the third place is one of the most prominent Syrian 
businessmen, Nabil Kuzbari, who owns substantial shares in Cham Bank and Bank 
Al-Sharq, with 5% and 1.5%, respectively. Riad Bechara Obegi, a Syrian-Lebanese 
businessman, is the fourth largest investor with ownership stake of 2.33 million shares 
at Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi. In the fifth place is Nader Qal'i, a trusted associate of 
Rami Makhlouf, who owns 5% of Bank Byblos-Syria - in which the latter was one of 
its biggest investors. 
 
Following him in the sixth place is Ihasan Baalbaki with 5% ownership stake at BSO. 
In the seventh place is Bassel Hamwi who is a major shareholder in Audi Bank-Syria 
with 3% stake. Hamwi had a long career at the World Bank and later became the 
General Manager of Audi Bank-Syria, until his resignation in early 2014, but still 
maintains his 3% shareholdings. Muhammad Murtada al-Dandachi is the eighth 
largest investor with 1.74 million shares at Bank Byblos-Syria. In the ninth place is 
Louay Abdel Hamid al-Assar who owns 3% in Cham Bank. The tenth largest investor 
in the private financial sector is Ahmad Said Al-Shihabi who owns 5% of Fransabank-
Syria and 1% in Bank Al-Sharq. Other renowned Syrian businessmen with 
considerable investments in these private banks, whose shareholdings exceed the 
million shares threshold, are Mohammad Tarif Al-Akhras; Khwanda brothers - Karim 
and Ali; George Achi; Ahmad Abboud; Mahran Hazar; Bassam Maamari and Ahmad 
Rahif al-Atassi. 
 
5.3. Public investors 
     Investment in the banking sector has also included Syrian government officials and 
entities that also wanted to take part in the erstwhile profitable sector. As 
demonstrated before, state-owned entities also have commercial interests in these 
private banks, where they invested their cash surplus. To illustrate, the General Social 
Security Organisation owns approximately 18.14 million shares, the equivalent of 
2.31% of overall private banks’ stocks. These shareholdings are divided between two 
Qatari banks: 10.25% of QNBS with 15.42 million shares and 0.32% of Syria 
International Islamic Bank with 2.7 million shares. Furthermore, several government-
affiliated unions and syndicates have invested in several private banks to tap into the 
former booming banking sector, reaching 4.21% or 33 million of their total shares. 
The pension fund of Engineers’ Syndicate owns more than 8.87 million shares, 
equalling 1.11% of private banks’ total stocks. These are divided among 5% QNBS, 
2.23% of IBTF and 2% of Cham Bank. 
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An interesting phenomenon is also evident in the Syrian banking sector, with state-
owned banks owning stocks in other private competitors. For instance, the sanctioned 
public Savings Bank owns 4% of QNBS with 6.16 million shares, making 0.79% of 
total private banks’ shares. Equally, current and former government officials are also 
major investors in the banking sector, but which has not attracted much public scrutiny 
of this controversial involvement. Amer Hosni Lotfi, the head of State Planning 
commission and the former Minister of Economy and Trade between 2004 and 2010, 
is one of the largest individual investors in the IBTF with more than 152,200 shares. 
He was also appointed to the board of directors as the Deputy Chairman in October 
2013, according to the bank’s disclosures.  
 
6. Conclusion 
     As the conflict drags on in the absence of a viable political solution, the Syrian 
economy will continue to disintegrate and metastasise into a war economy. While the 
government will try to display an air of normalcy in its held territory by announcing 
new development and reconstruction projects, substantial financial support will prove 
harder to attain. However, modest cash inflows from its allies and aid agencies will 
help it finance its operational expenses. The emerging asymmetry between the 
relatively safe government-held areas and the conflict-ridden territories outside regime 
control will allow the resumption of basic business activities in the former while 
hampering any form of sustainable recovery in the latter. Meanwhile, the role of the 
Central Bank of Syria will be mainly focused on maintaining the stability of the 
foreign exchange rate, while avoiding any major runs on the Syrian pound, witnessed 
in the summer of 2013. The depleting foreign cash reserves, collapse of export 
revenue and increasing sanctions amid the increased costs of the raging war will make 
this task harder to achieve, without ongoing financial and economic commitment from 
its allies.       
 
In the meantime, the impact of the civil war will continue to be manifested in the 
shrinking operations and ownership of the banking sector. State-owned and private 
banks have equally struggled to recover the loans extended to companies and 
individuals, with increasing provisions for non-performing loans and defaults. 
Notwithstanding the setbacks, these banks’ mission seems to have shifted to ‘wait the 
conflict out’, in anticipation of its eventual resolution – which looks increasingly 
implausible any time soon. The latest estimates and figures released in September 
2014, paint a clearer picture of private banks’ shareholding structure since the start of 
the conflict in 2011. In the past three years, the ownership map has changed after 
several local and foreign investors, both institutional and retail, have decided to divest 
from the banking sector for either economic or political reasons. At the same time, 
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others have further invested in the ailing sector in spite of the severe operational, 
financial, political and security risks. Reports based on banks’ third-quarter filings for 
2014 indicate that institutional investors represent the highest owners in private banks 
with 29 local and foreign commercial entities owning approximately 58%, and the 
remaining 42% owned by more than 34,600 individual investors. Considering that 
almost all private banks are listed on the DSE, which surprisingly still comply82 with 
the Exchange’s disclosure regulations during the raging civil war, access to updated 
corporate and ownership information on the Syrian Commission on Financial Markets 
& Securities (SCFMS) is still possible, although incomplete and at times 
contradictory. As it stands, the total number of private banks’ shares is 783.9 million; 
institutional investors own 452.7 million and the remainder 331.3 million shares are 
owned by individuals.  
 
Syrian investors and commercial entities have sizable shareholdings that gave them 
seats at the board of directors. Among the notable Syrian companies with stakes 
owned in these banks are Syrian Libyan Company for Industrial & Agricultural 
Investments, Kuwaiti-Syrian Holding Company and Arab Union Reinsurance 
Company. Foreign companies and financial institutions constitute strategic and 
principal investors in the Syrian banking sector, which did not only bring their 
decades-long of institutional experience in banking but also substantial capital to 
support their operations in the country. Since these private banks are subsidiaries of 
foreign financial institutions, they have primarily constituted the principal, if not the 
majority, shareholders in these banks. This has given them the advantage to participate 
and influence strategic decisions of these banks, benefiting from their local knowledge 
of the market. Notwithstanding the raging civil war83, which entered its fourth year in 
March 2014, almost all the foreign commercial entities either maintained their 
substantial shareholdings or, paradoxically, increased their ownership stake in these 
banks. Although not conclusive, the plausible rationale behind their decision to 
maintain their investments while scaling back their operations, is the enormous 
opportunities after the eventual resolution of the conflict. Otherwise, it would not be 
prudent to maintain such an extremely high-risk investment on their balance sheets 
and justify it to their shareholders, regardless of the size of their footprint. More than 
three years of a destructive civil war, Syria still appears to these institutions to be a 
potential lucrative source of income, even if they have to swallow the bitter pill of 
losses incurred in the country for the time being. Eventually, it can be argued that 
banks will play an instrumental role in the reconstruction of the country, once this 
conflict comes to an end.  
 
In contrast to the decision of foreign investors to suspend their real estate and tourism 
projects in the country, foreign shareholders of private banks have maintained their 
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stake in these businesses. Some of these real estate projects were still under 
construction or located in conflict zones, justifying an immediate decision to suspend 
them. However, when the conflict broke out in 2011 several private banks were 
newcomers and also operated in areas where the fault lines between urban and rural 
areas were pronounced. In spite of that, these banks have largely maintained their 
presence in the country and as this research showed some of them even increased their 
investments in these subsidiaries. Three years after the start of the Syrian conflict, all 
14 private banks are still operating in the country, albeit on a minimal basis. Their 
banking activities have been severely scaled back and they have shifted their 
operations to recovering retail and corporate loans for the past three years84. Counter 
to their earlier expanding retail and corporate lending portfolio, these banks have been 
at pains to reduce the soaring rate of defaults on non-performing loans by both 
individuals and companies.  
 
Gulf banks are still very much present in the country by either maintaining their stake 
in their investees or increasing their shareholdings in those banks. The Commercial 
Bank of Kuwait grew its ownership by more than three folds from 10% in Cham Bank 
to a whopping 32%, transforming it into one of the bank’s major shareholders. 
Another Gulf-based bank United Gulf Bank of Bahrain amplified its shareholdings of 
its subsidiary SGB from 24% to 31%. While the Kuwaiti Al-Fouttouh Investment 
Company did not follow the footsteps of its other fellow companies, it did not divest 
its shareholdings of SGB either, by maintaining its 11% ownership stake at the bank. 
Similarly, the Bahrain-based Al-Baraka Banking Group is still very much present in 
the country through its 23% ownership of its subsidiary Al-Baraka Bank-Syria. The 
Emirates Islamic Bank also maintained its 10% shareholding stake in the same bank 
since its initial investment in it. 
 
The traditionally conservative banking sector in Lebanon does not seem to have 
flinched by the extremely high commercial and operational risks in Syria. As of the 
first-half of 2014, not a single Lebanese bank has liquidated its investments in the 
country, although it has been hit hard and its banking activities have come to a 
standstill in Syria85. This decision is highly informed by these banks’ own experience 
in their country’s 15-year-old civil war between 1975 and 1990, where banks held 
their ground in anticipation of the eventual conclusion of the conflict. The Lebanon-
based Byblos Bank increased its shareholdings in its subsidiary Byblos Bank-Syria by 
44% from an initial share of 41.5% of the bank’s equity to become the majority 
shareholder with 59.81% over the past three years. The Lebanese Blom Bank, which 
owned 39% of its subsidiary BSO, amplified its shareholdings by 10% to almost own 
half of the bank’s equity to 49%. Equally, its fellow Fransabank, which was one of the 
last Lebanese banks to enter the Syrian market in 2009, increased its ownership in its 
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eponymous subsidiary Fransabank-Syria from 48% to become the majority 
shareholder with almost 56% of the bank’s shares. Audi Bank-Syria serves as an 
exception to this rule, where its three main Lebanese investors, namely Banque Audi 
Lebanon, Audi Saradar Investment Bank and Lebanon Invest, chose to hold their 
investments at 41%, 3% and another 3%, respectively. The experienced and 
sophisticated Jordanian banks did not seem to disagree with the strategy of rival banks 
from other Arab competitors in their gambit to participate in the waiting game and 
expand their possessions. The Jordan-based Arab Bank Group also increased its 
imprint in its identically named Arab Bank-Syria marginally from 49% to 51.28%. 
However, the Jordanian Housing Bank for Trade and Finance – one of the first 
institutional investors in private banks in Syria – maintained its substantial investment 
level in the IBTF at 49%. Considering the already significant investment of Bank of 
Jordan in its eponymous subsidiary Bank of Jordan-Syria with 49%, the bank chose 
not to increase its investment to the allowed threshold of foreign investors to 60%.  
 
As illustrated above, the preservation and expansion of Qataris’ investments in the 
Syrian banking sector after 2011 presents a noteworthy phenomenon to be explored 
further. This is especially important considering the hostile stance of the Qatari 
government towards the Syrian regime. The relations between the two governments 
did not only break down by suspending all diplomatic activities between the countries, 
but also the Syrian regime accuses the Qatari Al-Thani ruling family of funding the 
Syrian opposition to topple the regime in Damascus. Hence, these existing links 
openly contradict the political stance of Qatar with its economic interests in the 
country especially since several government-owned and affiliated institutions are also 
shareholders of the same bank, such as the Syrian General Social Security 
Organisation and the Engineers’ Syndicate that hold considerable shares in the two 
Qatari banks. What is more problematic is the existing shareholdings of the two 
blacklisted state-owned Savings Bank and Popular Credit Bank in QNBS. This adds 
another layer of not just policy inconsistency, but also a legal liability, as a Qatari 
government-owned bank is in a commercial partnership with an internationally 
sanctioned bank. Banks that carry out operations in the US and EU are required to 
comply with these sanctions, even if they are not domiciled in any of these countries. 
In the last few years, we have seen a flurry of cases with hefty fines imposed on banks 
for breaking these sanctions86. It remains to be seen if continuing economic blockades 
and isolation of the Syrian regime will finally force foreign investors to divest from 
the financial system. For the time being, Arab investors in private banks have been 
biding their time and watched their annual negative return on investment by staying in 
the country. Their decision to remain in the country has made them one of the main 
beneficiaries of the ultimate resolution of the conflict.  
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